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Détail de l'auteur
Auteur H. J. FERGUSON |
Documents disponibles écrits par cet auteur (2)
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Autistic Adults are Not Impaired at Maintaining or Switching Between Counterfactual and Factual Worlds: An ERP Study / H. J. FERGUSON in Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 52-1 (January 2022)
[article]
Titre : Autistic Adults are Not Impaired at Maintaining or Switching Between Counterfactual and Factual Worlds: An ERP Study Type de document : Texte imprimé et/ou numérique Auteurs : H. J. FERGUSON, Auteur ; L. WIMMER, Auteur ; J. BLACK, Auteur ; Mahsa BARZY, Auteur ; D. WILLIAMS, Auteur Article en page(s) : p.349-360 Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Adult Autism Spectrum Disorder Autistic Disorder/diagnosis Brain Comprehension Evoked Potentials Humans Reading Autism Counterfactuals Event-related potentials Language comprehension N400 Index. décimale : PER Périodiques Résumé : We report an event-related brain potential (ERP) experiment that tests whether autistic adults are able to maintain and switch between counterfactual and factual worlds. Participants (N?=?48) read scenarios that set up a factual or counterfactual scenario, then either maintained the counterfactual world or switched back to the factual world. When the context maintained the world, participants showed appropriate detection of the inconsistent critical word. In contrast, when participants had to switch from a counterfactual to factual world, they initially experienced interference from the counterfactual context, then favoured the factual interpretation of events. None of these effects were modulated by group, despite group-level impairments in Theory of Mind and cognitive flexibility among the autistic adults. These results demonstrate that autistic adults can appropriately use complex contextual cues to maintain and/or update mental representations of counterfactual and factual events. En ligne : http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10803-021-04939-4 Permalink : https://www.cra-rhone-alpes.org/cid/opac_css/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=455
in Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders > 52-1 (January 2022) . - p.349-360[article] Autistic Adults are Not Impaired at Maintaining or Switching Between Counterfactual and Factual Worlds: An ERP Study [Texte imprimé et/ou numérique] / H. J. FERGUSON, Auteur ; L. WIMMER, Auteur ; J. BLACK, Auteur ; Mahsa BARZY, Auteur ; D. WILLIAMS, Auteur . - p.349-360.
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders > 52-1 (January 2022) . - p.349-360
Mots-clés : Adult Autism Spectrum Disorder Autistic Disorder/diagnosis Brain Comprehension Evoked Potentials Humans Reading Autism Counterfactuals Event-related potentials Language comprehension N400 Index. décimale : PER Périodiques Résumé : We report an event-related brain potential (ERP) experiment that tests whether autistic adults are able to maintain and switch between counterfactual and factual worlds. Participants (N?=?48) read scenarios that set up a factual or counterfactual scenario, then either maintained the counterfactual world or switched back to the factual world. When the context maintained the world, participants showed appropriate detection of the inconsistent critical word. In contrast, when participants had to switch from a counterfactual to factual world, they initially experienced interference from the counterfactual context, then favoured the factual interpretation of events. None of these effects were modulated by group, despite group-level impairments in Theory of Mind and cognitive flexibility among the autistic adults. These results demonstrate that autistic adults can appropriately use complex contextual cues to maintain and/or update mental representations of counterfactual and factual events. En ligne : http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10803-021-04939-4 Permalink : https://www.cra-rhone-alpes.org/cid/opac_css/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=455 Belief-attribution in adults with and without autistic spectrum disorders / E. E. F. BRADFORD in Autism Research, 11-11 (November 2018)
[article]
Titre : Belief-attribution in adults with and without autistic spectrum disorders Type de document : Texte imprimé et/ou numérique Auteurs : E. E. F. BRADFORD, Auteur ; V. HUKKER, Auteur ; L. SMITH, Auteur ; H. J. FERGUSON, Auteur Article en page(s) : p.1542-1553 Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : autistic spectrum disorders belief-attribution false-belief perspective-taking theory of mind Index. décimale : PER Périodiques Résumé : An important aspect of daily life is the ability to infer information about the contents of other people's minds, such as what they can see and what they know, in order to engage in successful interactions. This is referred to as possession of a "Theory of Mind" (ToM). Past research has shown that adults with Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD) often show deficits in social communication abilities, although can successfully pass tests of explicit ToM. The current study utilized a computerized false-belief task to explore subtle differences (i.e., measuring response times and accuracy rates) in how efficiently ToM capacities-specifically, belief-attribution-are utilized in adults with and without ASD. In the task, participants were asked to attribute a belief-state to either themselves or another person, following establishment of a true or false-belief scenario. Results revealed comparable patterns of ToM engagement across individuals with and without ASD, with faster and more accurate responses to "Self" versus "Other" oriented questions, and slower response times when shifting between the "Self" and "Other" perspective compared to when maintaining a perspective. However, autistic individuals showed a particular deficit in correctly identifying a belief-state in false-belief trials, in which two contrasting belief-states had to be held in mind, suggesting more difficulty disengaging from current, reality based belief-states than neuro-typical individuals. Autism Res 2018, 11: 1542-1553. (c) 2018 International Society for Autism Research, Wiley Periodicals, Inc. LAY SUMMARY: To successfully communicate, we have to think about what other people do/do not know; this is called having a "Theory of Mind." This study looked at how well people use their Theory of Mind when thinking about the contents of people's minds. Results showed that people with autism had difficulties considering more than one mental state at a time, suggesting they may have more trouble in stopping themselves thinking about what is happening in reality than people without autism. En ligne : http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/aur.2032 Permalink : https://www.cra-rhone-alpes.org/cid/opac_css/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=370
in Autism Research > 11-11 (November 2018) . - p.1542-1553[article] Belief-attribution in adults with and without autistic spectrum disorders [Texte imprimé et/ou numérique] / E. E. F. BRADFORD, Auteur ; V. HUKKER, Auteur ; L. SMITH, Auteur ; H. J. FERGUSON, Auteur . - p.1542-1553.
Langues : Anglais (eng)
in Autism Research > 11-11 (November 2018) . - p.1542-1553
Mots-clés : autistic spectrum disorders belief-attribution false-belief perspective-taking theory of mind Index. décimale : PER Périodiques Résumé : An important aspect of daily life is the ability to infer information about the contents of other people's minds, such as what they can see and what they know, in order to engage in successful interactions. This is referred to as possession of a "Theory of Mind" (ToM). Past research has shown that adults with Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD) often show deficits in social communication abilities, although can successfully pass tests of explicit ToM. The current study utilized a computerized false-belief task to explore subtle differences (i.e., measuring response times and accuracy rates) in how efficiently ToM capacities-specifically, belief-attribution-are utilized in adults with and without ASD. In the task, participants were asked to attribute a belief-state to either themselves or another person, following establishment of a true or false-belief scenario. Results revealed comparable patterns of ToM engagement across individuals with and without ASD, with faster and more accurate responses to "Self" versus "Other" oriented questions, and slower response times when shifting between the "Self" and "Other" perspective compared to when maintaining a perspective. However, autistic individuals showed a particular deficit in correctly identifying a belief-state in false-belief trials, in which two contrasting belief-states had to be held in mind, suggesting more difficulty disengaging from current, reality based belief-states than neuro-typical individuals. Autism Res 2018, 11: 1542-1553. (c) 2018 International Society for Autism Research, Wiley Periodicals, Inc. LAY SUMMARY: To successfully communicate, we have to think about what other people do/do not know; this is called having a "Theory of Mind." This study looked at how well people use their Theory of Mind when thinking about the contents of people's minds. Results showed that people with autism had difficulties considering more than one mental state at a time, suggesting they may have more trouble in stopping themselves thinking about what is happening in reality than people without autism. En ligne : http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/aur.2032 Permalink : https://www.cra-rhone-alpes.org/cid/opac_css/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=370