Counterfactual and false-belief reasoning in individuals with autism / Célia RASGA

Public ISBD in Thinking, Reasoning, and Decision Making in Autism / Kinga MORSANYI Titre : Counterfactual and false-belief reasoning in individuals with autism Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Célia RASGA, Auteur ; A. Cristina QUELHAS, Auteur ; Ruth M.J. BYRNE, Auteur Année de publication : 2019 Importance : p.88-112 Langues : Anglais (eng) Index. décimale : PAR-A PAR-A - Fonctionnement Autistique Résumé : This chapter focuses on the cognitive processes that underlie the well-documented difficulties in false-belief reasoning experienced by individuals with autism. It provides a brief introduction to counterfactual thinking in typically developing individuals and to some of the differences in counterfactual thinking in children and adults with autism. The chapter discusses the idea that counterfactual thinking is an important ingredient in false-belief reasoning in typically developing children. It proposes that a crucial feature of counterfactual thoughts is that they enable people to view an event in different ways – the way the event actually happened, and some of the various ways in which it could have happened differently. The chapter argues that the differences observed in the way in which individuals with autism engage in counterfactual thinking provide an important clue to understanding their difficulties in false-belief reasoning. Counterfactual imagination may be an essential ingredient in the development of false-belief reasoning. Permalink : https://www.cra-rhone-alpes.org/cid/opac_css/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=418 in Thinking, Reasoning, and Decision Making in Autism / Kinga MORSANYI Counterfactual and false-belief reasoning in individuals with autism [texte imprimé] / Célia RASGA, Auteur ; A. Cristina QUELHAS, Auteur ; Ruth M.J. BYRNE, Auteur . - 2019 . - p.88-112. Langues : Anglais (eng) Index. décimale : PAR-A PAR-A - Fonctionnement Autistique Résumé : This chapter focuses on the cognitive processes that underlie the well-documented difficulties in false-belief reasoning experienced by individuals with autism. It provides a brief introduction to counterfactual thinking in typically developing individuals and to some of the differences in counterfactual thinking in children and adults with autism. The chapter discusses the idea that counterfactual thinking is an important ingredient in false-belief reasoning in typically developing children. It proposes that a crucial feature of counterfactual thoughts is that they enable people to view an event in different ways – the way the event actually happened, and some of the various ways in which it could have happened differently. The chapter argues that the differences observed in the way in which individuals with autism engage in counterfactual thinking provide an important clue to understanding their difficulties in false-belief reasoning. Counterfactual imagination may be an essential ingredient in the development of false-belief reasoning. Permalink : https://www.cra-rhone-alpes.org/cid/opac_css/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=418

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How Children with Autism Reason about Other’s Intentions: False-Belief and Counterfactual Inferences / Célia RASGA in Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 47-6 (June 2017)  

Public ISBD [article]  inJournal of Autism and Developmental Disorders > 47-6 (June 2017) . - p.1806-1817 Titre : How Children with Autism Reason about Other’s Intentions: False-Belief and Counterfactual Inferences Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Célia RASGA, Auteur ; Ana Cristina QUELHAS, Auteur ; Ruth M.J. BYRNE, Auteur Article en page(s) : p.1806-1817 Langues : Anglais (eng) Mots-clés : Reasoning  Counterfactuals  False beliefs  Intentions  Autism Index. décimale : PER Périodiques Résumé : We examine false belief and counterfactual reasoning in children with autism with a new change-of-intentions task. Children listened to stories, for example, Anne is picking up toys and John hears her say she wants to find her ball. John goes away and the reason for Anne’s action changes—Anne’s mother tells her to tidy her bedroom. We asked, ‘What will John believe is the reason that Anne is picking up toys?’ which requires a false-belief inference, and ‘If Anne’s mother hadn’t asked Anne to tidy her room, what would have been the reason she was picking up toys?’ which requires a counterfactual inference. We tested children aged 6, 8 and 10 years. Children with autism made fewer correct inferences than typically developing children at 8 years, but by 10 years there was no difference. Children with autism made fewer correct false-belief than counterfactual inferences, just like typically developing children. En ligne : http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10803-017-3107-3 Permalink : https://www.cra-rhone-alpes.org/cid/opac_css/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=308 [article] How Children with Autism Reason about Other’s Intentions: False-Belief and Counterfactual Inferences [texte imprimé] / Célia RASGA, Auteur ; Ana Cristina QUELHAS, Auteur ; Ruth M.J. BYRNE, Auteur . - p.1806-1817. Langues : Anglais (eng) in Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders > 47-6 (June 2017) . - p.1806-1817 Mots-clés : Reasoning  Counterfactuals  False beliefs  Intentions  Autism Index. décimale : PER Périodiques Résumé : We examine false belief and counterfactual reasoning in children with autism with a new change-of-intentions task. Children listened to stories, for example, Anne is picking up toys and John hears her say she wants to find her ball. John goes away and the reason for Anne’s action changes—Anne’s mother tells her to tidy her bedroom. We asked, ‘What will John believe is the reason that Anne is picking up toys?’ which requires a false-belief inference, and ‘If Anne’s mother hadn’t asked Anne to tidy her room, what would have been the reason she was picking up toys?’ which requires a counterfactual inference. We tested children aged 6, 8 and 10 years. Children with autism made fewer correct inferences than typically developing children at 8 years, but by 10 years there was no difference. Children with autism made fewer correct false-belief than counterfactual inferences, just like typically developing children. En ligne : http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10803-017-3107-3 Permalink : https://www.cra-rhone-alpes.org/cid/opac_css/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=308

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